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Counterterrorism From Bush to Obama to
Trump
Dawn Johnsen
MICHELLE SHEPHARD / REUTERS
Pre-dawn light shines on a compound at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay in Cuba,
October 2012.
The election of Donald Trump as president of the United
States has stunned the nation and the world and raised a
number of critically important issues about the future of U.S.
government policy. Among these are hotly contested aspects
of national security law, including the extent of government
surveillance and secrecy, the use of drones for targeted
killings, the detention and interrogation of suspected
terrorists, immigration and refugee policies, and the
deployment of U.S. forces in various roles across the Middle
East. The stakes could not be higher: in the balance hang
national security, democratic accountability, the rule of law,
civil liberties, and the very nature of the republic.
Two recent books can help navigate these vital issues. Charlie
Savage’s Power Wars and Karen Greenberg’s Rogue Justice
both analyze the U.S. government’s handling of national
security since 9/11. Their thoughtful examinations of the
counterterrorism policies of the administrations of George W.
Bush and Obama deserve to be widely read, by the public at
large and by those who will staff the next administration. So,
too, does Savage’s detailed assessment of the Bush
administration in his previous book, Takeover: The Return of
the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American
Democracy. Taken together, Savage’s Power Wars and
Takeover will stand among the definitive accounts of the
United States’ approach to national security and law over the
past decade and a half. Greenberg’s less detailed but clear
and engaging book will be accessible to broader audiences
and serve as an important reminder of the Bush
administration’s excesses.
At the heart of both books lies the question of whether Obama
fulfilled the expectation that he would change the national
security policies and executive-power claims of his
predecessor. Greenberg finds Obama’s performance deficient;
Savage’s assessment is more balanced. Both authors are at
times too harsh in their judgments, especially Greenberg,
whose accusations of “hypocrisy” and “betrayal” are
imprecise and exaggerated. In fact, Obama rejected Bush’s
ideology of expansive executive authority and has done much
to restore the rule of law to the U.S. government. True,
Obama did not accomplish all that he attempted, and some of
his actions deserve criticism. But his inability to do more
stemmed largely from obstacles that Savage addresses: the
mess Obama inherited, the intractability of the underlying
problems, virulent partisan opposition, and extreme
congressional dysfunction.
LAW GOES TO WAR
Five days after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. Vice President Dick
Cheney appeared on Meet the Press and promised that the
United States would use “any means at its disposal” to fight
terrorism. In the days and weeks following an unprecedented
mass killing on U.S. soil, some excesses, although regrettable,
were understandable. But in the years that followed, the Bush
administration sanctioned torture; held “enemy combatants”
indefinitely without legal due process at secret prisons
around the world and at the detention facility in Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba; began warrantless domestic surveillance on a
massive scale; and ordered military commissions to conduct
trials of detainees—proceedings that the Supreme Court later
declared unlawful as designed. The Bush administration
largely built these policies in secret and on shaky, sometimes
rotten legal foundations.
U.S. AIR FORCE/TECH. SGT. EFFRAIN LOPEZ/HANDOUT/REUTERS
A U.S. Air Force MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle flies over California,
January 2012.
In 2008, Obama ran for president emphasizing the ways in
which he would reverse course: he promised to end the
practice of torture, close Guantánamo, work with Congress,
reduce secrecy, and put U.S. counterterrorism on a solid legal
footing. But just how different has Obama’s use of executive
power been from Bush’s? For Greenberg, the answer is not
very. Greenberg brings to bear the valuable expertise she has
gained as the director of Fordham Law School’s Center on
National Security. Even those steeped in the subject will learn
from her narration of terrorism-related judicial proceedings,
for example, and the persistent efforts by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) to secure judicial review to force the
government to release information vital to the proper
functioning of U.S. democracy.
Greenberg’s criticism of both the Bush and the Obama
administrations is scathing. She is on the mark regarding the
Bush administration’s well-publicized shortcomings. She
emphasizes that Obama failed to close Guantánamo,
continued military commissions and mass surveillance,
maintained high levels of government secrecy, held no one
accountable for the torture committed under Bush, and
ramped up targeted killings using drones. Many disappointed
progressives agree with Greenberg’s emphasis on the
continuities between the two administrations—as do some
former Bush administration officials and others who are
cheered, rather than discomforted, by the thought.
Just how different has Obama’s use of executive power been
from Bush’s?
Greenberg makes some strong arguments, but others are
incomplete or ultimately unpersuasive. For example, she
highlights a speech that Eric Holder delivered at the
American Constitution Society during the 2008 presidential
campaign, when he was in private practice, in which he said
that “we owe the American people a reckoning.” She then
criticizes Holder for flip-flopping when he decided, as
Obama’s attorney general, not to prosecute for torture those
who “acted reasonably and relied in good faith” on the
government’s authoritative legal advice (bad as that advice
may have been). But Greenberg ignores the serious obstacle
that the constitutional guarantee of due process presents to
this particular form of accountability: How can it be fair or
just for the U.S. Department of Justice to advise that an action
would be lawful and then later prosecute those who relied on
that advice? The reckoning Holder called for came in more
appropriate (although incomplete) forms, such as the Obama
administration’s prompt public release and repudiation of
many of the Bush administration’s legal opinions and the less
prompt, partial release of the U.S. Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence’s report on the Bush administration’s
detention and interrogation program.
Greenberg’s charges that many Obama administration
officials were guilty of hypocrisy and worse are excessive.
“For every Cheney mongering fear and nurturing paranoia,”
she writes, “there are many officials quietly going about their
business . . . thinking they are doing the right thing but failing
to grasp that in their wish to protect the country, they are in
fact betraying it.” Her assessment helpfully identifies
influential institutional pressures that tend to receive
inadequate attention, but she does not fully account for the
critical roles that the president and the vice president play in
setting the direction of policies or the impediments that those
further down the chain face if they seek to buck choices made
at the top.
CHANGE YOU CAN BELIEVE IN?
Savage covers more ground and tells a more nuanced story.
Drawing on his extensive access to government sources and
his experience in covering these issues for more than a
decade for The New York Times and The Boston Globe, he
provides a rare window into the Obama administration’s
internal executive-branch decision-making. He gives the
Obama administration relatively high marks when it comes to
restoring and upholding the rule of law, emphasizing Obama’s
rejection of extreme interrogation methods, black sites, and
indefinite detention. He also details Obama’s struggles in the
face of powerful opposition and new congressional
restrictions—explaining, for example, that reforming, rather
than eliminating, military commissions was part of the effort
to close Guantánamo while adhering to a congressionally
imposed prohibition on transferring any detainees from
Guantánamo to the United States.
Trump threatens far more than Obama’s legacy.
Savage’s careful reporting and analysis enable readers to
make their own judgments about the degree of continuity
between the two administrations. One of Savage’s greatest
contributions is a distinction early in the book that clarifies a
sharp, puzzling divide among progressives. Some critics on
the left have castigated the Obama administration for
continuing Bush’s approach to executive power and national
security. Greenberg, for example, describes a 2010 ACLU
advertisement that portrayed Obama’s face morphing into
Bush’s. Other progressives, including numerous lawyers with
experience in recent Democratic administrations, strongly
disagree. (This is a group with which I identify: I served as
the acting head of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal
Counsel under Bill Clinton and on Obama’s transition team,
and in 2009, Obama nominated me to head the Office of Legal
Counsel. But for more than a year, Senate Republicans
blocked a vote on my nomination, and I ultimately withdrew
my name from consideration.)
Savage explains the split by noting that there were in fact two
strands of criticism of the Bush administration, although they
were often interwoven. One strand opposed Bush’s policies
fundamentally because they harmed civil liberties. The other
condemned his administration for undermining the rule of
law. Obama’s adherence to legal constraints and his rejection
of Bush’s extreme view of executive power substantially
addressed the rule-of-law critique. But Obama’s decision to
continue many of the actual policies in question even if in
modified, legal forms frustrated the expectations of those who
had hoped for a much fuller restoration of civil liberties.
Savage also explains that these expectations were artificially
high; on close inspection, some of Obama’s own rule-of-law
criticisms were misinterpreted as promises that he would
expand civil liberties.
NO COMPARISON
To understand just how stark the difference is between
Bush’s and Obama’s approach to the rule of law, one must
understand a crucial Supreme Court precedent. In April 1952,
in the middle of the Korean War, the United Steelworkers of
America planned to go on strike. Just before the strike began,
President Harry Truman seized control of the nation’s steel
mills, on the grounds that such a disruption would damage
the United States’ ability to wage war. The steel companies
sued, and, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer,
the Supreme Court ruled that Truman’s actions exceeded his
constitutional and statutory authorities.
It was an unusual instance in which the Supreme Court
rejected a president’s assertion of wartime authority. In his
concurring opinion, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson
laid out how to judge whether a president possesses the
authority to conduct a particular executive action. Among
legal scholars, the courts, and government lawyers, his
framework has become a touchstone. But Youngstown has
never earned its deserved place in mainstream debates the
way Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade have. And
neither Greenberg nor Savage evaluates the Bush and Obama
administrations in Jackson’s terms, which is unfortunate.
Jackson’s core insight was simple: to assess whether an
executive action is legal, one must consider what Congress
has said on the subject. Jackson rejected the claim that
presidents possess general emergency powers to act in ways
that would otherwise be beyond the law, yet he allowed
relatively broad presidential authority to act when Congress
has not spoken to the contrary. More specifically, he
delineated a framework of three essential zones of executive
power that vary based on congressional action. The
president’s power is at its “lowest ebb,” Jackson held, when
he acts in defiance of Congress’ expressed will, and it is at its
maximum when he acts with congressional approval. In
between these poles is what Jackson called “the zone of
twilight,” when the president acts in the absence of
congressional direction; there, the president typically may
act, but only as long as Congress does not disagree.
MICHELLE SHEPHARD / REUTERS
The sun rises over the U.S. detention center "Camp Delta" at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, October 2012.
The Bush administration repeatedly asserted that as
commander in chief, the president had the power to act
contrary to federal statutes (or to interpret them in such a
way that they did not constrain his sweeping view of
executive power)—most notoriously, to avoid limits on
interrogations and surveillance. Its legal analyses typically
failed to even cite, much less properly apply, Youngstown.
Savage won a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage in The Boston
Globe of the unprecedented number of “signing statements”
that Bush issued to challenge laws that conflicted with his
expansive views of his constitutional authorities. Many
presidents, Obama among them, have asserted limited
authority to disregard or otherwise avoid statutory commands
that their administrations deemed unconstitutional. But in an
exhaustive historical review, the legal scholars David Barron
and Martin Lederman documented that Bush was a historical
outlier in his assertions of “lowest ebb” commander-in-chief
authority to wage war in ways contrary to Congress’
direction. And even when Congress would have supported
Bush’s policies through new legislation, the Bush
administration preferred to bypass Congress, because,
Savage writes, Bush and Cheney were “in the business of
creating executive-power precedents” to license future
unilateral executive action.
As is evident from Savage’s account, this is where the Obama
administration sharply changed direction. It rejected the Bush
administration’s disregard for the rule of law and disavowed
extreme notions of commander-in-chief powers that would
override Congress’ clearly expressed will. Obama also
announced that he preferred to work with Congress, and he
sought its support repeatedly, even in the face of
extraordinary congressional dysfunction. With Congress
paralyzed, Obama often did resort to executive action, but
typically by asserting authority that Congress had already
granted him or that fell in Jackson’s “zone of twilight.” The
Youngstown analysis shows how Obama’s critics err when
they equate these actions with Bush’s “lowest ebb” claims of
ultimate presidential power to override Congress.
It will be up to the electorate to hold Trump accountable
should he fail to respect constitutional limits on his authority
as president.
Some critics of Obama have argued, for example, that he
acted unlawfully by ordering certain targeted killings with
drones and, in the domestic context, by ordering the
suspension of deportations of children whose parents brought
them to the United States illegally. But it is crucial to note
that in neither case did Obama assert executive authority to
overrule Congress; Congress had not legislated on those
precise questions, and Obama never suggested that he would
refuse to follow any constitutional statute that Congress
might enact contrary to his policies. To take another example:
Obama did not assert overriding executive authority to fulfill
his commitment to close Guantánamo. He has instead
complied with a congressional ban on bringing detainees to
the United States, which has proved devastating to his ability
to close the camp. Critics can mount legitimate and, at times,
strong arguments against Obama’s national security policies
and even some of his legal interpretations, but it is wrong to
claim that he shared Bush and Cheney’s beliefs about
expansive executive power.
In particular, Greenberg errs when she equates the legal
opinion that informed the Obama administration’s targeted
killing, in September 2011, of Anwar al-​Awlaki, a U.S. citizen
and al Qaeda member in Yemen, with the 2002 opinion that
the Bush administration relied on to support torture. She
denigrates the lawyers in both cases by describing them as
following “marching orders.” In fact, the opinions stand in
stark contrast: the Obama administration’s was a model of
careful legal analysis in the best traditions of the Office of
Legal Counsel; the Bush administration’s was an ends-driven,
extreme piece of advocacy—after it was leaked, it earned
bipartisan condemnation and was withdrawn, and replaced,
by the Bush administration itself. The Harvard law professor
Jack Goldsmith has described reading “deeply flawed” and
“sloppily reasoned” opinions when he joined the Bush
administration as head of the Office of Legal Counsel in 2003.
The Obama administration’s opinion on targeted killing made
no argument comparable to the Bush administration’s
erroneous claim that the commander in chief had the
authority to disregard or misinterpret Congress’ ban on
torture. Instead, Congress’ post-9/11 Authorization for Use of
Military Force had conferred on Obama the requisite power
to wage war, and Obama faced no statute that specifically
sought to ban or restrict such targeted killings.
Savage raises important questions about a few of the Obama
administration’s legal interpretations. Most significant,
Savage makes the case that the Obama administration erred
when it concluded that U.S. air strikes in Libya did not
constitute “hostilities” under the War Powers Resolution and
thus were not subject to a 60-day deadline after which the
president must get approval from Congress. Yet even here,
Obama explicitly acknowledged the limits of executive
authority: he accepted the law’s constitutionality, never
questioned Congress’ authority to end the operation, and
provided a detailed public explanation of his interpretation.
It is on the issue of secrecy that Savage and Greenberg make
the strongest case that there has been too much continuity
between Bush and Obama, although even there, fundamental
differences exist. The Bush administration subverted
democracy by secretly acting contrary to law, based on a body
of undisclosed internal legal justifications. Only when leaks
brought to light torture, surveillance, extraordinary
renditions, and the underlying flimsy legal justifications could
the appropriate democratic processes commence.
Nothing suggests that the Obama administration has secretly
violated any laws or otherwise come close to the Bush
administration’s unprecedented secrecy. But the Obama
administration has, at times, struck the wrong balance and
kept from the public information that it could have shared
without endangering national security. Its prolonged failure
to disclose the details of major targeted-killing and
surveillance programs undermined vital democratic debate
and safeguards. And the administration made a serious error
in withholding from the public its legal analysis behind
targeted killing, which it could have shared—as it ultimately
did—by omitting details that could have harmed national
security. Excessive secrecy poses a direct threat to the
delicate balance between executive and congressional powers
and to the public’s ultimate ability and duty to check
government. Reasonable minds may differ on legal
interpretations, but secrecy destroys the possibility of
democratic engagement.
A NATION OF LAWS?
Savage and Greenberg both sound hopeful notes in assessing
where the nation stands as Obama’s presidency nears its end.
Greenberg writes, “As Barack Obama’s presidency draws to a
close, the flames of the counterterrorism frenzy that were
ignited fifteen years ago have begun to die down. Neither civil
liberties nor the rule of law was consumed.” But during his
presidential campaign, Trump relentlessly fanned those
flames, and his victory casts an ominous light on Savage’s
prediction that Obama’s legacy will ultimately “be determined
by his successor, future Congresses and the world as it is
rather than as one might want it to be.”
Government employees should be prepared to push back,
even at the risk of losing their jobs, if the Trump
administration directs them to take part in wrongdoing.
In fact, Trump threatens far more than Obama’s legacy. Many
of the most extreme proposals Trump has put forward would
require an expansion of presidential power fundamentally at
odds with the constitutional order. Of course, it is possible
that Trump’s calls for unlawful actions will prove to have been
little more than campaign hyperbole. And much will depend
on the cabinet members and advisers he appoints. Trump may
come to recognize—as the vast majority of people do when
they assume positions of significant authority in
government—that he will need to rely on the counsel of
experts who have dedicated their lives to public service. In
her concession speech, Hillary Clinton called on her
supporters to grant Trump “an open mind and a chance to
lead.” But she also emphasized the continued need for public
engagement and singled out the importance of defending
foundational constitutional values: “the rule of law, the
principle that we are all equal in rights and dignity, freedom
of worship and expression.”
If Trump seeks to disregard the legal barriers for which he
expressed so much disdain during the campaign, Savage’s
and Greenberg’s books will help point the way for those
looking to constrain him. They chronicle numerous instances
of resistance to excessive executive power, particularly in the
early Bush administration, by the press, domestic and
international nongovernmental organizations, state and local
governments, and foreign nations, and also by the federal
courts, Congress, and some within the executive branch itself.
Each of these vital institutions played an important role—for
example, in building broad bipartisan opposition to the Bush
administration’s use of torture (although Republican leaders
remain split on the issue).
The Supreme Court played a central role in rejecting the Bush
administration’s most egregious abuses, just as in
Youngstown, it rejected Truman’s seizure of the steel mills. If
Trump overreaches, the courts should step up once again.
Congress, meanwhile, should consider how during the Bush
administration, individual senators from both parties—notably
Republican Senator John McCain and Democratic Senator
Sheldon Whitehouse—helped force public disclosures and
spark change.
Finally, during the Bush administration, many executive-
branch officials and employees resisted unlawful policies and
actions. Government employees should be prepared to push
back, even at the risk of losing their jobs, if the Trump
administration directs them to take part in wrongdoing. Leaks
of classified information played a significant role in informing
the public of torture and surveillance programs that should
not have been kept secret from the American people. But
leaks come at a very high cost, are rarely justified, and should
never be necessary if strong systems exist to protect whistle-
blowing. In its final months, the Obama administration should
strengthen such systems. It should also release any
information on policies and legal analyses that it can publicize
without jeopardizing national security and that might help
constrain the Trump administration.
Trump and his supporters may defend aggressive, even
unlawful uses of executive power by claiming that he is
following in the footsteps not only of Bush but also of Obama.
In this, they will find support from some commentators who
have embraced the mistaken idea that Obama adopted Bush’s
expansive view of executive authority. This idea is not only
wrong; it is now also dangerous. Yes, Obama continued some
controversial national security policies, arguably to the
detriment of civil liberties, but he restored respect for the
rule of law and unequivocally rejected Bush’s assertions of
“lowest ebb” executive authority to act unlawfully. The sooner
observers understand this distinction, the better they will be
able to hold Trump to account.
Ultimately, however, it will be up to the electorate to hold
Trump accountable should he fail to respect constitutional
limits on his authority as president. As Jackson wrote in
Youngstown, “With all its defects, delays and inconveniences,
men have discovered no technique for long preserving free
government except that the Executive be under the law, and
that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.”
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